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Private education and inequality in the knowledge economy
Evelyne Huber , Jacob Gunderson and John D. Stephens
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
ABSTRACT
This article explores the consequences of public and private spend-
ing on education at all levels, looking at skills and income inequal-
ity. We use data for 22 affluent democracies from 1960 or 1995
(depending on data availability) to 2017. High levels of public
education spending consistently lower income inequality, both
measured as wage dispersion and as the education premium. In
contrast, higher levels of private education spending are associated
with both higher wage dispersion and a higher education premium.
We show that this effect works in part through differential skills
acquisition. Public education spending raises the math scores of
15-years old students at the mean and at the 25th percentile, but
private education spending has no effect on skills at these levels.
We find the same pattern among skills of adults; public education
spending raises skills at the 25th percentile and the mean; private
spending has no effect. Finally, we also show that higher levels of






Advanced post-industrial societies are leading the way in the transition to the knowl-
edge economy, and the repercussions of this transition are felt in the developing world
as well. That transition has economic and social consequences, some of which are
contributing to enhanced human welfare, while others are not. Potentially beneficial
consequences are enhanced productivity and economic growth. However, the realiza-
tion of these benefits depends on an adequate supply of skills in the society to fill the
new types of jobs. Moreover, even where the aggregate supply of skills is sufficient to
generate economic growth, the transition is accompanied by undesirable effects in the
form of increasing inequality and poverty due to unequal integration of individuals into
the new labor market and due to changes in labor market institutions.
The problem of growing inequality has attracted much academic and political
attention, and it has begun to direct more of this attention to comparative educational
systems and education policy, an area traditionally neglected in welfare state research
and in political science more generally (Gift & Wibbels, 2014). Most quantitative
research in this area has looked at determinants of education expenditures, whereas
comparative small-N studies have looked at dynamics of school reform and governance
and at the relationship between skills formation and Varieties of Capitalism (Busemeyer
& Trampusch, 2011; Gift & Wibbels, 2014). What has received less attention are the
sources of education funding and the ways in which education funding is spent. In
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particular, the relative contribution of public and private sources to total education
spending at different levels has not received much attention. The impact of different
funding sources is important to understand because, to the extent that countries
address the need for more skills by relying on private sources of funding, they may
exacerbate inequality rather than reducing it.
Income inequality is shaped by many factors. It is in part a result of unequal integration
into the labor market due to a mis-match between the demand for and the supply of skills.
At the level of society, the greater this mismatch, the greater the education premium and
therefore inequality in incomes (Card & Lemieux, 2001; Goldin & Katz, 2008). At the
individual level, people with low skills have seen their job prospects and earnings potential
shrink (Nickell, 2004). Thus, one might assume that higher levels of spending on education
in a society will result in overall better skills and thus lower inequality because it will
increase the supply of employees with high skills. However, it is well established that factors
other than skills also shape market income distribution. Specifically, labor market institu-
tions and politics have been shown to be powerful determinants of wage dispersion
(Pontusson, Rueda, &Way, 2002; Rueda & Pontusson, 2000; Wallerstein, 1999). We intend
to show that educational institutions also shape earnings inequality.
We aim to explain the role of public and private education funding in shaping aggregate
educational achievements and skill levels, the returns to education, and their impact on
income inequality. We shall proceed in two steps: First we show that public education
expenditure is indeed associated with lower wage dispersion, whereas private education
expenditure shows the opposite pattern – an association with greater wage dispersion. Then
we attempt to demonstrate the mechanisms that mediate this relationship by focusing on
the relationship between funding sources and educational outcomes in the form of skills,
and on the impact of different skill levels and of different education funding sources on the
education premium. For the first step, we can rely on sufficient data of good quality to carry
out pooled cross-section analyses. For the second step we facemajor data constraints and in
part have to rely on simple cross-sectional analyses.
Literature and hypotheses
The education requirements for personal and for societal success in the knowledge
economy and the implications of educational efforts for inequality have become central
themes in the policy literature at least since the publication of Goldin and Katz’s The Race
Between Education and Technology (2008). Much of the early quantitative literature on
educational systems focused on educational expenditure, treating it as an indicator of
societal commitment and as a tool to improve human capital (Castles, 1989). At the same
time, the development of endogenous growth theory argued that investments in human
capital increased economic growth. The early quantitative studies operationalized human
capital with average years of education in the adult population drawing on the Barro-Lee
data on education levels across time in almost every country in the world (Barro & Lee,
1997, 2001). At the same time, scholars began analyzing the limited data available on test
scores as measures of actual skills (Barro 2001). Hanushek and Kimko (2000) found that
adding test scores to models with average years of education greatly increased the
variation explained in subsequent economic growth. Hanushek and Woessmann
(2008), in an analysis of data for 50 countries over the period 1960–2000 found that
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quantity of schooling was significantly associated with economic growth in models
without measures of cognitive skills but lost significance once cognitive skills were
included in the model, and the adjusted R2 increased from .25 to .73, indicating
a much stronger impact of the stock of human capital on economic growth than earlier
quantitative studies.
Ideally, then, if we are interested in the consequences of educational expenditures, we
should focus on how they shape the level and the distribution of skills in a society. It is no
secret that education can be of highly differential quality, and access to educational
institutions of different quality can be selective, which might result in a highly uneven
distribution of skills. In addition, there are determinants of earnings capacity other than
skills. Professional success and earnings capacity also depend heavily on conditions of
access to well paying positions, and such access in turn is channeled through social
networks that often have their roots in educational institutions. Thus, a succession of
access to selective educational institutions, to social networks, and to well paying positions
in the labor market may shape earnings inequality irrespective of skill distributions.
We would expect exclusively or predominantly public funding of schools to result in
a more even distribution of funding per student, a more even student body social class
composition, and thus a more evenly distributed quality of education than the coexistence of
public and private funding. Parents who are willing to pay for private schooling demand (pay
for) higher quality education, but studies question the differential effectiveness of private
versus public education, once social composition is controlled for (Dronkers & Robert, 2008).
What parents do get is a more socio-economically homogeneous student body and thus an
avenue to social class reproduction (Dronkers & Avram, 2010). This is due to the fact that
private funding entails private decisions on admissions, so parents’ socio-economic back-
ground is important for admission not just based on ability to pay but also based on ability to
meet social admissions criteria. The reason for parental preference for a socio-economically
homogenous student body may be academic in the sense of greater uniformity of academic
preparation and support at home, or it may be social in the sense of preventing social mixing
and investing in the cultural and social capital of their children (Zweigenhaft, 1993).
There are clear exceptions to the egalitarian nature of public funding where public
funding is based on local property taxes, like in the United States. There are also limits
to the egalitarian impact of public funding where high levels of residential segregation
by socio-economic status or immigration status generate student populations with
radically different backgrounds in terms of preparation for learning and family support
for learning. This is becoming a growing problem in European societies with generally
egalitarian funding of public education.
There is a third type of organization of education to be considered: publicly funded
but privately run schools. The impact of this type of organization on equality of
education and of professional access depends on the rules governing these schools,
specifically their ability to levy additional fees and to discriminate in admissions. If they
can levy additional fees and discriminate in admissions, their impact on the distribution
of educational achievement and earnings capacity will be similar to that of privately
funded and run schools. However, where they are subject to rules that prohibit social
segregation, such as in Belgium and the Netherlands, they may not have an inegalitarian
impact (Schlicht, Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2010). In Sweden, the bourgeois
government elected in 1991 passed legislation which allowed parents to send their
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children to private schools with a voucher. When the Social Democrats returned to
power in 1994, they amended the legislation prohibiting schools from charging tuition
or fees over and above the value of the voucher and also prohibiting them from having
selective admissions criteria.
There is some preliminary evidence for the inegalitarian impact of private education
expenditure. Busemeyer (2015) found that the private share of education spending at all
levels was positively related to the Gini of disposable household income in the period
1997–2008 in advanced industrial societies. In contrast, he found that public spending on
all levels of education was negatively related to the Gini of disposable household income in
the same country/year observations. Weisstanner and Armingeon (2018) found that public
expenditure on education depressed and private expenditures on education increased the
education premium in 22 OECD countries between the early 1990s and 2014. In their
analysis of top 1% income shares, Huber, Huo, and Stephens (2018) found that the private
share of total tertiary spending was strongly associated with greater top income shares.
We are going beyond these studies in two major ways. First, we analyze different
measures of inequality, the 90:10 and 50:10 wage ratios. They measure pre-tax and
transfer earnings and thus are more closely related to education and skills than the Gini
of disposable household income, which is highly sensitive to household composition
and the degree of welfare state redistribution. Moreover, they let us identify where in
the income distribution the impact of different sources of education funding matters
most. Second, we demonstrate that the mechanism that mediates the effect of different
sources of education funding on earnings inequality is the skill formation in the society.
We show that public education funding raises skill levels at the bottom and at the mean,
whereas private education funding fails to do so. Finally, we show that higher skill levels
in the society depress the education premium.
On the basis of extant knowledge and the above reflections on selective access to
education and to positions in the labor market, we have the following expectations
regarding the relationship between funding sources for education, skills, and earnings
inequality.We expect public education spending to reduce inequality and private education
spending to increase it, measured both as wage dispersion and the education premium.We
expect public education spending to be particularly important for the lower half of the
income distribution. We also expect public education spending to raise skills in the society
and private education spending to have a weaker or no effect on skills, particularly at the
lower end. Finally, we expect higher skill levels in a society to be associated with a lower
education premium.
Sources of education spending are only one among many influences on the distribu-
tion of skills and the returns to skills in post-industrial societies. The literature has
identified an affinity between education systems and welfare state regimes (Iversen &
Stephens, 2008; Mosher, 2015; West & Niolai, 2013).1 Weisstanner and Armingeon
(2018) found that high average tax rates and high levels of spending other than on the
elderly depressed the education premium. The embeddedness of education systems in
1Given the affinity between welfare state regimes and education systems, it is not surprising that the findings on the
political origins of different sources of education funding parallel those of the literature on the political origins of
welfare states. Ansell (2010) finds a powerful positive effect of left-wing control of government on public education
spending. Wolf’s (2009) findings confirm the partisan effects, identifying Conservative and Christian Center parties as
sources of lower public shares of education funding.
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welfare state regimes is important because high levels of poverty depress skills acquisi-
tion at the bottom. The sociology of education literature has firmly established the
lasting negative consequences of disadvantaged family and community backgrounds for
the educational success of children (Duncan, Boisjoly, & Harris, 2001; Fergusson, John
Horwood, & Boden, 2008; van Ewijk & Sleegers, 2010). Accordingly, in our analysis of
skills acquisition we shall include poverty levels in the society, and we expect high levels
of poverty to depress skills acquisition.
Finally, in analyzing the education premium we include controls for the supply of
and demand for highly educated workers, and for unemployment. Goldin and Katz
(2008) made a compelling case that inequality in the United States has increased
because the country has lost the race between technology and education. That is,
since the 1970s, the US has not invested enough in schooling to increase the supply
of the high skilled to keep pace with increased demand due to skill biased technological
change. It is reasonable to generalize the insight that this race shapes income distribu-
tion, specifically the skill premium. High levels of unemployment can be expected to
drive up inequality by depressing wages at the bottom.
Data and measurement
We use data for 22 post-industrial democracies from 1960 on for our baseline model on
wage dispersion and from 1995 on (depending on data availability) and until 2017 for
the models with public and private education spending. The countries are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Luxembourg falls out of all
analyses except the analysis of the education premium (Table 7). Australia, Belgium,
Greece, Portugal, and Switzerland lack usable data for skills in the PIACC studies. In
addition, Japan, New Zealand, and Portugal lack LIS data on poverty from the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
Our first set of analyses focuses on the relationship between public and private
education spending and the distribution of earnings both across the economy and for
just the lower half of earners. The first dependent variable is the ratio of gross earnings
received by an individual at the 90th percentile of earnings to the gross earnings received
by an individual at the 10th percentile. While this measure allows us to investigate the
relationship between our independent variables and income inequality across most of the
income distribution, our second dependent variable, the ratio between the gross earnings
of an individual at the 50th and 10th percentile of earnings, enables us to focus our
analysis on the effect of skills and education funding further down the income distribu-
tion, where we expect the effect of public education spending to be particularly strong.
We use the OECD wage dispersion database to establish our basic finding because it
contains over four times as many observations as the LIS database, the alternative source
for data on market personal income.
We measure the distribution of skills among students with results from the
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) which is run by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The PISA tests
are given triennially to 15-year-olds across the OECD along with several partner
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countries to evaluate reading literacy, mathematical literacy, and scientific literacy. The
scores are then standardized to have an OECD average of 500 with about two-thirds of
scores between 400 and 600. For the purposes of this article we use only the country
mean score and 25th percentile score in mathematical literacy for our pooled-cross
sectional analysis (OECD multiple years), which give us a measure for the central
tendency of skill distribution and a measure of performance for low academic achievers.
We use mathematical skills, because, as Hanushek, Schwerdt, Wiederhold, and
Woessmann (2015) note with regard to PIAAC, they are generally more comparable
cross-nationally than literacy skills.
We measure the distribution of skills among the adult population with scores from the
Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) operated by
the OECD. The PIAAC tests, unlike the PISA tests, are given to a nationally representative
sample of adults (16–65), and they are designed to measure three broad categories of skills:
literacy, numeracy, and problem solving in technology rich environments (OECD, 2013b).
We only have PIAAC data from a single wave and we mainly use the numeracy scores,
adjusted for literacy related non-responses, for the reasons just mentioned. We only use
literacy scores in one model and we do not use the problem solving scores because they are
the most weakly related to income of the three tests (Hanushek et al., 2015).
Our final dependent variable is the wage premium to education. Calculated by
Weisstanner and Armingeon (2018) using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data, this
variable is the percentage difference between the median wage of full-time workers with
tertiary education and the median wage of individuals without tertiary education (pre-
tax).2 Because LIS is carried out in waves and not all countries provided information in
each wave, the number of observations of this variable varies by country. For most
countries, we have data from the early 1990s through 2013, with an average of just
under seven observations per country for which data were provided. Data were not
available for Japan, New Zealand, and Portugal.3
The primary independent variables of interest for this article are indicators of
education expenditure and the distinction between public and private sources of
education expenditure. We use total education spending, public education spending,
and private education spending, all as a percent of GDP. The data breaking down
education expenditure into public and private begin between 1995 and 1997. We look at
funding sources rather than enrollment in public versus private schools because of the
wide variation of the rules under which private schools operate. We also capture public
human capital spending, which includes public education spending, daycare spending,
and active labor market policy spending as a percent of GDP. The inclusion of this
measure reflects the necessity of investigating in education as a part of a cluster of social
policies (Iversen & Stephens, 2008; Mosher, 2015). The sources and a description of
these variables, as well as all other variables, are presented in Table 1.
As noted, we control for the effect of poverty on skill levels. We capture poverty with
the percentage of households headed by individuals of working age (18–65) below 50%
2Weisstanner and Armingeon’s education premium measure calculated from LIS data is highly correlated (r=.91) to
Hanushek’s measure of skill returns calculated from the PIAAC data, which gives one great confidence in the validity
of the measure.
3Because not all states provide data on pre-tax income, full-time status, or education, certain cases have special
calculation procedures. For information on these cases, see Weisstanner and Armingeon (2018).
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of median disposable household income, and we assess its impact on skills acquisition
of 15-year old students. We calculated poverty level with micro-data from LIS and
Eurostat’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions surveys (SILC, n.d.). We also
measure the same concept of poverty as the average of poverty levels in the 1980s, when
the younger cohorts among the adults in the PIAAC study were growing up, and we
assess its impact on skills of these adults. Skills in the adult population are measured by
numeracy scores from PIAAC, as explained above.
The distribution of wages is also a product of labor market and political institutions
in addition to individual skill levels. As such, we control, when possible with the
number of observations available, for other important political and economic factors.
One such variable is the degree of fragmentation in wage coordination (Visser, 2019;
Wallerstein, 1999). Higher values indicate more centralization, ranging from the level of
individual firms to economy-wide wage setting, with the literature consistently finding
that more centralized systems of wage coordination are associated with less wage
inequality. The strength of unions also plays a strong role in conditioning the distribu-
tion of wages across the economy, which we operationalize as union density, net union
membership as a percent of employed wage and salary earners (Pontusson et al., 2002;
Visser, 2019). We also control for the history of leftist government with the cumulative
proportion of seats of parties in government belonging to left parties as these parties
have programmatic commitments to create more egalitarian economic outcomes
(Brady, 2009; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Pontusson et al., 2002; Stephens, 1979).
The education premium should be shaped by the relationship between demand for
and supply of educated workers. We measure the demand for educated workers with
total factor productivity, an indicator of technological advancement. We measure the
supply of educated workers with the percentage of the population with at least some
tertiary education. Since unemployment affects disproportionately workers with low
education, and unemployment depresses wages of workers with high risk of unemploy-
ment, high levels of unemployment can be expected to be associated with an increase in
the education premium. We measure unemployment as the percentage of the popula-
tion of working age who, in the reference period: are without work; are available for
work; and have taken specific steps to find work.
Statistical estimation
For the cross sectional data, we estimate the models with OLS (ordinary least squares)
regressions. Statistical methodologists (e.g. Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, p. 329;
Hicks 1994, p. 172) identify four problems with OLS estimation posed by the non
independence of observations in pooled time series: (1) errors are serially correlated, (2)
errors are cross-sectionally heteroskedastic, (3) errors tend to be correlated across units
due common shocks, and (4) errors tend to be autocorrelated and heteroskedastic at the
same time. To deal with these problems, Beck and Katz (1995,1996) recommend
addition of unit and period dummies and a lagged dependent variable to the right
hand side of the equation, calculation of panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), and
imposition of a common rho for all cross-sections. Plümper et al. (2005) note that this
set up, which they call the ‘Beck-Katz standard,’ does effectively deal with all four
problems, but, unfortunately, introduces some of its own problems. Following Achen
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(2000), they argue that the lagged dependent variable can absorb most of the theore-
tically interesting time series variance in many pooled time series datasets. Indeed, this
is true of our data: The lagged dependent variable alone explains 94% of the variation in
the data; the addition of the period dummies raises this to 95% while the introduction
of all of the theoretically interesting variables adds nothing to the variation explained.
Our solution is to deal with serial correlation by correcting for first order auto-
regressiveness rather than by inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Beck and Katz
(Beck & Katz, 2004, 2011) have shown that correcting for first order auto-regressiveness
(ar1 corrections) actually does include a lagged dependent variable on the right hand
side of the equation (PCSE and ar1 corrections are known as Prais Winsten estima-
tions). Thus, it does deal with the problem of serial correlation but without, as our
results show, suppressing the power of other independent variables.
We estimate our Prais Winsten models in Stata 14.2 using Vernby and Lindgren's
(2009) dvgreg package. Dvgreg is specifically designed to estimate dynamic panel data
models with gaps in the dependent variable but complete or nearly complete data on the
independent variables. It generates an estimate of the value of the dependent variable at
t-1 for each gap, based on the values of the dependent variable at the previous actual
observation and the values of the independent variables. This then makes it possible to
derive a corrected estimate of AR1. We use Vernby and Lindgren’s modification of Prais
Winsten estimation when the data are pooled time series data, that is, when wage
dispersion, education premium, or Pisa scores are the dependent variables. As mentioned,
when the data are cross sectional, we use ordinary least squares regression.
We hypothesize that most of our causes operate over long periods of time and
changes in the dependent variables occur gradually, a case of cumulative causes in
Pierson’s (2003, p. 198) typology of causes and effects. Thus, it is appropriate to
measure the dependent and independent variables as levels. Moreover, in almost all
pooled time series studies of the determinants of inequality, regardless of whether it is
measured by wage dispersion, the Gini coefficient of household income, or top income
shares, the dependent variable is measured as a level. This is another reason to measure
the dependent and independent variables as levels.4 This raises the issue of whether the
series are stationary. A Fisher test for unit roots shows that the series are stationary.
In order to control for common economic shocks, such as oil price increases or
global economic cycles, we include period dummies. The periods selected are the
latter part of the Golden Age of post war growth (1960–1972), oil shocks and
stagflation of the seventies (1973–1979), the period of deregulation up to the intro-
duction of the single European market (1980–1992), the global financial crisis
(2008–2012) and the post-crisis period (2013–2017). The reference period is
1993–2007, the transition to the knowledge economy.
Results
We begin with an analysis of the determinants of wage dispersion between the top and
the bottom of the income distribution, the ratio of gross earnings of a full time worker
4For this reason, error correction estimation in which the dependent variable is measured as a first difference is not an
appropriate technique to model the hypothesized causal processes.
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at the 90th percentile to those of a worker at the 10th percentile (Table 2). We then
compare these results with the ratio of gross earnings of a full time worker at the 50th
percentile to those of a worker at the 10th percentile (Table 3). Model 1 is our baseline
with the three variables that have consistently been shown to be significant predictors of
wage dispersion: union density, wage coordination, and left government (Pontusson
et al., 2002). In model 2 we introduce total education spending and drop left govern-
ment, because left government is a cause of public education spending (Ansell, 2010).
Total education spending has no effect on wage dispersion. In model 3 we replace total
education spending with public and private education spending. We find that higher
levels of public education spending are associated with lower wage dispersion between
both the top and bottom and the middle and the bottom, whereas higher levels of
private education spending are associated with greater levels of wage dispersion.
Given that the standard deviation of the 90:10 ratio is larger than the standard
deviation of the 50:10 ratio, we cannot compare the unstandardized coefficients in the
two tables. In order to deal with this problem, we standardized both dependent
variables and then reran model 3 for each dependent variable. The negative coefficient
of public spending is 68% larger and the coefficient of the inequality enhancing private
spending is 23% larger for the 50:10 ratio compared to the 90:10 ratio, but these
differences fall somewhat short of statistical significance. In model 4 we replace public
education spending with public human capital spending, which includes spending
on day care and on active labor market policies together with public spending on
education at all levels. We find that total human capital spending also depresses wage
dispersion and that the coefficient again is larger at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion, by 48% in the models with the standardized dependent variables. The impact of
private education spending remains significant and increases earnings dispersion. We
cautiously interpret these consistent differences as suggesting that public spending is
particularly beneficial, and conversely, heavy reliance on private education funding has
particularly detrimental effects for workers at the bottom of the income distribution.
In Table 4 we investigate the effects of public and private education spending on the
scores of 15-year old students on the test of mathematical skills. These are the aggregate
national level scores for all the waves of the PISA tests conducted between 2000 and 2015.
The reason for focusing on math scores rather than literacy scores is that they are more
comparable across countries than the literacy scores. Moreover, as we shall show later,
math skills among adults are more significant for earnings potentials than literacy skills.
We focus on the mean scores and on the scores at the 25th percentile. Since we would not
expect the level of education expenditure in the year of observation to shape the test
scores of students, we use the cumulative average of education spending, for both public
and private spending, from 1990 and 1995 to the year of the test score observation.
We find that public education spending raises the math scores of students at the 25th
percentile and the mean, but that private education spending is insignificant for scores
at both the 25th percentile and the mean. The substantive effect of public education
spending is greater for scores at the 25th percentile than the mean. One standard
deviation in public education spending raises test scores by 9.3 points at the 25th
percentile and 4.9 points at the mean. This finding supports the contention that public
funding of education is crucial for lifting up the academically lower achieving groups.
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In previous work, we have shown that poverty among the parental generation
depresses skill acquisition among children (Huber and Stephens 2015). Accordingly,
in models 2 and 4 we introduce poverty among households headed by a working age
Table 2. Determinants of wage dispersion (90–10 Ratio).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Union density −.009*** −.141*** −.010*** −.009***
Wage coordination −.163*** −.194*** −.192*** −.187***
Left government −.016***
Total education spending .001
Private education spending .136* .133**
Public education spending −.067*
Human capital spending −.056*
Constant 4.095*** 4.094*** 4.139*** 4.116***
Common ρ .90 .90 .90 .90
R2 .55*** .49*** .52*** .52***
Observations 588 252 252 252
Note: All models include period dummies. *significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001.
Table 3. Determinants of wage dispersion (50–10 ratio).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Union density −.002*** −.004*** −.002** −.002*
Wage coordination −.049*** −.048*** −.047*** −.044***
Left government −.005***
Public education spending −.036**
Total education spending −.006
Private education spending .055*** .055***
Human capital spending −.027***
Constant 1.952*** 1.951*** 1.971*** 1.938***
Common ρ .90 .90 .90 .90
R2 .45*** .40*** .45*** .46***
Observations 593 252 252 252
Note: All models include period dummies. *significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001.
Table 4. PISA scores and public-private mix in education.
Math 25th Percentile Score
Model 1 Model 2
Public education spending 7.864** 2.706
Private education spending 1.483 6.319
Poverty −3.611***
Constant 392.390*** 452.046***




Model 3 Model 4
Public education spending 4.170* 1.207
Private education spending 6.031 7.045
Poverty −4.313***
Constant 473.552*** 529.766***
Common ρ .90 .80
R2 .04* .32***
Observations 104 89
Note: *significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001.
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adult. Poverty has a highly significant depressing effect on scores at both levels.
Moreover, once we control for poverty, education spending becomes insignificant in
both models. These findings underline the importance of social policy context for the
effectiveness of public education spending.
Table 5 displays the results of our analysis of the relationship between cumulative
average education expenditures, poverty in the parents’ generation, and skill levels
among adults. Unfortunately, data here are even scarcer than for the skill levels of 15-
year olds. Essentially, the only recent study is the PIAAC survey, conducted under the
auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in
2011–2012. The study covered 24 countries, including 15 of the advanced industrial
democracies under analysis here. There are problems with the data because of con-
siderable differences in literacy related non-responses. The data we use here are
calculated to adjust for these non-responses, following the method used by the OECD
to adjust the published mean scores. The data for Belgium could not be properly
adjusted and therefore are omitted. We are analyzing scores at the 25th percentile and
the mean, and we compare the effect of public to the effect of private education
spending. We use the average of education spending from the beginning of the data
(1995) to 2010. We control for poverty levels when the adults being tested were of
school age. At both skill levels, the impact of public education spending is significant
and the impact of private education spending is not statistically significant. As expected,
poverty levels in their youth have a highly significant negative effect on skill levels
among adults. Nevertheless, the effect of public education spending remains significant
once we introduce the poverty controls. Public education spending has been crucial for
building skills at the bottom and the mean, whereas private education spending has
failed to make a contribution to skills at these levels.
Our next step is to assess the impact of skills on the returns to education. Here we
use skill levels among the adult population, since much can happen to skill forma-
tion after age 15, when the PISA tests are done. The scatterplot in Figure 1 makes
Table 5. PIAAC scores and public-private mix in education.
Numeracy 25 Percentile Adjusted Score
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Public education spending 4.916* 4.897*
Private education spending 1.719 1.322
Poverty in 1980s −3.280** −4.303** −3.462**
Constant 232.067*** 265.196*** 232.291***
R2 .69*** .55** 0.66**
Observations 14 14 14
Numeracy Mean Adjusted Score
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Public education spending 4.968* 4.91*
Private education spending 4.313 3.915
Poverty in 1980s −2.748** −4.130** −3.286*
Constant 264.299*** 297.897*** 264.904***
R2 .61** .47* 0.59**
Observations 14 14 14
Note: *significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001.
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clear that Italy is a big outlier, having an education premium much lower than one
would expect given the low numeracy level. Accordingly, we delete Italy from our
regressions. As models 1 and 2 in Table 6 demonstrate, the numeracy mean and the
literacy mean both depress the education premium. Numeracy skills emerge as more
important, however, because the variation explained is more than 50 percent larger.
A difference in variation explained persists once we introduce union density, the
single most important determinant of wage dispersion, in models 3 and 4.
Comparing models 5, 6, 7, 3, and 8, we can see that the skill levels at the very
bottom, the 5th percentile, do not affect the education premium, and skill levels at
the 10th percentile, while statistically significant, explain less of the variation than
skill levels at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile. So, it is in the broad middle, between
the 25th and the 75th percentile, that the quality of skills reduces the difference in
income between adults with and without tertiary education.
Our final step is to connect different patterns of education funding to the education
premium. The education premium is closer to education in the causal chain between
sources of education funding and earnings inequality than wage dispersion. In Tables 2
and 3 we already established the connection between education funding and wage
dispersion; here we are filling in one step in the causal chain. Models 1 to 3 in Table 7
show that public education expenditure is associated with a reduction of the education
premium, whereas private education expenditure is associated with an increase of the
Figure 1. Education premium and mean numeracy.
r = −.73, −.86 without Italy
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education premium. This result confirms the importance of public versus private educa-
tion spending for the gap between earnings of those with and without tertiary education.
Conclusion
We have shown repeatedly that the sources of education funding matter for income
inequality. High levels of public education spending consistently lower income inequal-
ity, both measured as wage dispersion and as the education premium. In contrast,
higher levels of private education spending increase both wage dispersion and the
education premium.
We have also shown that this effect works in part through differential skills acquisi-
tion. Public education spending raises the math scores of 15-year old students at the
mean and at the 25th percentile, but private education spending has no significant effect.
Moreover, the substantive effect of public education spending is greater on skills at the
25th percentile than for the mean. This underlines how crucial public education
spending is for the academically weaker groups. We have seen the same pattern in
the relationship between education spending and skills among adults. Public education
spending has a strong positive impact on adult skills at the 25th percentile and the
mean, and private education spending has no significant effect.
Table 6. Adult skills and the education premium.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mean Numeracy −0.009*** −0.006**
Mean Literacy −0.01** −0.005***
Union Density −0.003** −0.004**
Constant 2.802*** 3.026** 1.322* 1.822*
R2 .71 .42 .81 .72
Observations 13 13 13 13





Union Density −0.004** −0.003* −0.002* −0.003**
Constant .788*** 1.204** 1.712*** 2.215**
R2 .69 .74 .80 .79
Observations 13 13 13 13
Note: * significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001.
Table 7. Private/public mix, vocational training, and the education premium.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Public education expenditure -.086*** −.072***
Private education expenditure .083** .045*
% with tertiary education .005^ .003^ .004^
Total factor productivity .099 .172* .102
Unemployment .002 .013* .007*
Constant .650*** .056 .505***
Common ρ .90 .80 .90
R2 .52*** .30*** .60***
Observations 68 64 64
Note: * significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001, ^ significant but incorrectly signed.
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We have then shown that higher levels of adult skills indeed depress the education
premium. This effect is weaker at the very bottom than between the 25th and the 75th
percentiles. Given that we have data for only 13 countries for this analysis, the result is
more suggestive than conclusive, but it replicates a result found by Hanushek et al. (2015).
Finally, we have shown that the education premium is shaped in a similar fashion
as wage dispersion and skills acquisition: Public education spending reduces the
education premium, and private education spending in contrast drives up the
education premium.
In short, if societal success in the knowledge economy is understood not just as
economic growth but also equity in the sense of equitable improvement of skills at all
levels, including the bottom, then more education spending regardless of its source is
not the solution. Rather, it matters where that spending is coming from. Higher reliance
on private spending creates greater room for social selectivity, both in access to
educational opportunities and to careers. It has a particularly pernicious effect for
those at the lower end of the academic and social scale. In contrast, higher levels of
public education spending raise skills at all levels and reduce returns to education and
ultimately earnings inequality.
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